

## CONCLUSION

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### Challenging Social Inequality

#### Contention, Context, and Consequences

The Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) is undeniably a controversial movement in Brazil. It not only stands at the cutting edge of meaningful transformations in the country, in many regards, it is Brazil's cutting edge. No other Brazilian movement embodies the strength, incisiveness, and aspirations for fundamental social change represented by the MST. The chapters in this book provide a sympathetic yet nuanced assessment of this, grounded on extensive research and field experience.

This conclusion pulls together key findings and ideas in this collection and assesses their main implications for social change in Brazil. There are three sections to this chapter. The first, "Contention," opens with an examination of the principal arguments leveled against the MST's struggle for agrarian reform and delineates the broader contours of the debate at hand. The second section, "Context and Complexity," draws on the findings in this book to suggest ways in which a sharper understanding of the landless movement can be reached. The final section, "Consequences," examines the formidable obstacles to land reform in Brazil; the role of public activism in effecting change; and the radical democratic implications of the MST's fight for social justice.

#### **Contention**

This book takes part in a broader public debate over agrarian reform in Brazil. The insights offered here are rarely conveyed by the country's media establishment. Instead, the mainstream press has given ample attention to public intellectuals with very critical views of the MST's social struggle. Four of the best-known critics are: José de Souza Martins, Zander Navarro, Francisco Graziano, and Denis Lerrer Rosenfield.<sup>1</sup> Through their academic writings, news-

paper columns, and press interviews, all four scholars have played a key role in legitimizing skeptical views of agrarian reform and reinforcing harsh appraisals of the MST. Their arguments employ three basic lines of attack. The first depicts the MST as an “anachronistic, backward-looking movement” and is inclined to treat agrarian reform as an “outdated” policy. The other contends that land reform has turned out to be a “failure.” The third form of assault sustains that the MST’s confrontational relations with Brazil’s governing institutions represent a “threat” to democracy.

For Martins, one of Brazil’s most renowned rural sociologists, the MST is the local equivalent to the English Luddite movement, a short-lived popular uprising in the early nineteenth century famed for wrecking new factory machines. Incited by similar “fundamentalist” beliefs, he insists, the MST “refuses to recognize the institutional legitimacy and actions of the government and the state.” In fact, according to Martins, the movement’s actions and demands represent a “pre-political and precarious attempt to demolish the political order.”<sup>2</sup>

Martins further asserts that the MST and its church ally, the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), are led by radicalized middle-class intermediaries—professional activists, intellectuals, and clergy members—who filter the authentic voices and usurp the real demands of the rural poor. The ideological and partisan interests of these middle-class activists, he contests, ignore the peasantry’s essentially “traditional and conservative values of land, work, family, community and religion.” What’s more, their “apparent radicalism” does not address the “real roots of the problem,” but rather serves to “maintain the social inequities . . . (they) seek to change.”<sup>3</sup> In Martins’s view, the crux of Brazil’s agrarian impasse resides in the land reform activists themselves, who “manipulate” and “use” the rural poor in ways that replicate the old oligarchic patterns of landlord domination.<sup>4</sup> In other words, because of their misbegotten ideas the MST and CPT, not the landlords and their agribusiness allies, have become the main obstacles to progress in the countryside.

Navarro, a fellow sociologist, considers that, “The MST has lost its reason to exist, since the time for land reform has past. In fact, it ceased to be a historic and national necessity a long time ago, under any point of view.”<sup>5</sup> Urbanization and the successful development of agribusiness in Brazil have neutralized land reform’s *raison d’être*, as this policy is no longer necessary to stimulate the rural economy. Any mobilization against this historical trend is pointless.<sup>6</sup> Navarro further describes the MST as an “anti-systemic” and “anti-state” organization, driven by a hardened Marxist disposition toward non-institutional venues of action.<sup>7</sup> He argues that the MST stopped being a social movement in the 1990s. Instead, it degenerated into a “semi-clandestine,” “orthodox Leninist” organization, run by a small revolutionary cadre. The MST, Navarro stresses, is sustained through “non-democratic” practices, a “militarist ethos,” and the “quasi-religious devotion” of its activists. The group’s training centers

reproduce the “childish Leninism” of its national leaders and instill a “pathetic ideological mystification” of the world.<sup>8</sup>

The MST’s authoritarian disposition is such, Navarro adds, that it even “refuses to establish any type of political alliances with other popular organizations in the countryside.” Rather, “it seeks to combat them, and if possible, to dominate them.”<sup>9</sup> The MST, he claims, controls its land reform settlements through autocratic impositions and manipulations, including the extortion of settlers who depend on the organization for the allocation of public funds.<sup>10</sup>

Graziano, a former federal deputy and head of INCRA during the Cardoso administration, insists that the modernization of large landholdings have extinguished the traditional *latifundia* (vast and mostly unproductive rural estates). Because of this, Brazil has little or no more land to redistribute in its more developed regions.<sup>11</sup> For Graziano, “the main proof” that land reform is an “outdated recipe” can be “found in the resounding failure of the majority of existing rural settlements.” Agrarian reform “has done nothing to help reduce poverty in our country.” To the contrary, the demand on scarce resources from the public treasury, “subtracts benefits for other social policies, producing waste.”<sup>12</sup> If anything, he claims, agrarian reform is responsible for exacerbating poverty in the countryside, notably by producing rural *favelas* (shantytowns).<sup>13</sup>

Agrarian reform erred, according to Graziano, when “it lost its historic economic justification and was directed towards the realm of social policy. By trying to . . . assist the poor and those excluded from society, it left behind its (economic) rationality and drifted towards voluntarism.” Destitute people cannot “become competitive farmers.”<sup>14</sup> Most people mobilized by the MST, he argues, are undeserving claimants: “From the poorest to the well-off, shopkeepers, butchers, street peddlers, prostitutes, all of them want to put their little finger in this business of getting land for free, pretending to be landless.”<sup>15</sup> For Graziano, “The millions of landless people” that land reform proponents put forth “simply don’t exist; they are the product of a chimera, an ideological dream.”<sup>16</sup> The MST, in his view, is “an authoritarian guerrilla organization” that is “undermining democracy” by abetting acts of “agrarian terrorism” with its land occupations.<sup>17</sup>

Rosenfield treats the MST and CPT as both criminal and revolutionary organizations. He charges them with, “Property invasions, kidnapping, illegal possessions of weapons, disrespect for the law, and the destruction of property (along with) the generalized use of violence.” The MST and CPT’s real revolutionary intentions can be discerned from the “glamorization of violence” in their songs and poetry, as well as their affection for Che Guevara.<sup>18</sup> Along with Brazil’s main labor confederation, the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT), these organizations aim to “suppress the market economy, the rule of law, and representative democracy, that is, our liberties.”<sup>19</sup>

Rosenfield warns his readers not to be fooled by the MST’s demand for land

distribution, its calls for introducing a system of national plebiscites, its petition to reduce Brazil's record-high interest rates, and its representation of socialism in moral terms, because behind this façade, the MST is really bent on establishing a totalitarian communist system based on the Soviet and Cuban model.<sup>20</sup> The title of Rosenfield's book describes the MST as a "threat to democracy." His dire conclusions, though, are based principally on the exegesis of six texts: a CPT songbook, two issues of an MST magazine, a history publication on the landless movement, and two minor documents apprehended during a police raid at an MST camp.<sup>21</sup>

These four intellectuals have helped sanction recurrent media depictions of the MST as an "authoritarian, violent, manipulative, revolutionary organization that mobilizes false landless people." As such, they have endorsed a public image that treats the landless movement as a "danger" to the Brazilian state and its democratic regime. The tacit proposition, here, clearly underpins conservative calls to curtail MST demands and restrain their protest activities.

Such critiques of the MST shed greater light on its authors than on the phenomena they are keen to attack.<sup>22</sup> The extreme character of many of their statements, their gross oversimplifications, gratuitous charges, and the dearth of empirical evidence underlying many of their appraisals suggests that these intellectuals are more interested in deploying a "rhetoric of intransigence," in Albert O. Hirschman's fitting term, than facilitating a constructive dialogue.<sup>23</sup> Their restrictive and ahistorical understanding of democracy is certainly worrisome.

None of the texts surveyed here consider Brazil's stark social inequities a central analytical problem. Their main disagreement is with the MST and its struggle for land redistribution, rather than the underlying social dilemma. This outlook reveals much about the authors' political position on the classic Right-Left divide. According to philosopher Norberto Bobbio, "the essence" of this distinction,

is the different attitude that both parts—the people of the *right* and the people of the *left*—show systematically towards the idea of equality: the moral conduct and political action of those that claim to be of the *left* gives greater importance to that which makes (humans) equal, or to ways in which factors of inequality can be mitigated or reduced; those that claim to be of the *right* are convinced that inequalities cannot be eliminated, and ultimately have no desire to see their elimination.<sup>24</sup>

Contemporary MST critics generally treat land and income inequality as a peripheral matter, an afterthought, a distant feature in the nation's social landscape. By contrast, progressive scholars and activists tend to consider such disparities a key national dilemma. In their view, Brazil's glaring social inequality warrants extensive research, debate, and energetic public intervention.

These contrasting perspectives, no doubt, shape basic perceptions and appraisals of the MST. For conservatives and neoliberals, the MST is an anachronistic nuisance, a “lunatic” fringe group. Yet for socialists and progressive liberals, the MST is a contemporary movement of vital positive significance.<sup>25</sup> Appraisals of Brazil’s public debate over agrarian reform cannot ignore the full implication of Bobbio’s distinction: subjective dispositions concerning the problems of inequality are bound to affect the contentious views at stake.

### Context and Complexity

This book underscores the importance of understanding the MST’s struggle for agrarian reform through an enhanced appreciation for context and complexity. This outlook draws on a methodological effort to: (1) interpret the MST and Brazil’s agrarian reform process through a historical lens; (2) invest substantial time and efforts in garnering empirical evidence, notably through extensive fieldwork in the countryside; and (3) sharpen awareness of this phenomenon through a comparative perspective. The following comments address some of the principal issues raised by MST critics. They do so by building on these methodological concerns and gleaning insights presented throughout this book.

History is essential for appraising the MST’s broader significance for Brazil. It provides a crucial framework for interpreting its struggle and comprehending the enduring forces, institutions, and practices that have sustained land inequality in the Brazilian countryside. Guilherme Costa Delgado (chap. 2, this volume) and Leonilde Sérvolo de Medeiros (chap. 3, this volume), in particular, touch on key historical legacies: the vast *sesmaria* land grants to privileged colonial Portuguese families; the institution of slavery; and the formation of a society based on sharp class inequities, in a nation ruled by a predominantly authoritarian and patrimonial elite, embedded in a context of international economic dependence. The Land Law of 1850 enshrined Brazil’s large landholding oligarchy. Thereafter and throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the landlord class was able to block the extension of basic citizenship rights to peasants, including the right to form associations and, through literacy requirements, the right to vote.

Land reform’s forceful entry on the nation’s public agenda took place in the mid-1950s, as a result of peasant mobilizations in the northeast. The federal government’s first land reform proposal, in 1964, was thwarted by a military coup, which suppressed all reform activists and curtailed the newly formed, independent peasant organizations. Representatives of Brazil’s landlord class were active participants in the demise of the nation’s democratic regime. In fact, large landholders were prime beneficiaries of the ensuing two decades of authoritarian rule. During this time, vast sums of public monies were injected to modernize parts of the countryside, while preserving the existing land ten-

ure system. In the Amazon, the government subsidized the creation of huge estates. Under the military regime, the state effectively championed the creation of a new rural bourgeoisie, based on an agribusiness model of development, oriented toward international markets.

Brazil's redemocratization in the early 1980s opened the way for a new cycle of peasant mobilizations that placed agrarian reform back on the national agenda. In reaction, the landlords strengthened their own organizations and re-instituted the practice of hiring gunmen to assassinate their opponents. Drawing on their political influence, representatives of the landlord class were able to thwart the implementation of President José Sarney's 1985 agrarian reform program and defeat progressive measures for land distribution in the 1988 Constitution. The 1982 international debt crisis and the neoliberal policies introduced in the 1990s affirmed the large landholders' enduring strength, as agribusiness exports became a leading source of revenue to repay Brazil's foreign and domestic creditors. Even under Brazil's democratic regime, agricultural subsidies, rural development programs, and the state's execution of agrarian laws and taxes, have consistently favored the landlords over the peasantry. Between 1995 and 2005, each of the largest landlords had access to \$1,587 in government funds for every dollar made available to a landless family.<sup>26</sup>

A critical examination of these historical barriers to land reform casts the MST in an alternative light. If anything, it helps portray the movement as one engaged in a strenuous, uphill struggle to transform a society based on extreme disparities of wealth and power, long sustained by unfair state policies. Indeed, a close review of Brazilian history allows for an interpretation of the landless movement that turns the conservative imputations of backwardness, failure, and threat on their head. Archaic, here, is Brazil's deeply unequal land structure, not the movement trying to overcome it. Disappointing land reform results shed light on Brazil's landlord-friendly state, rather than the policy's actual merit. Moreover, as the historical record shows, the greatest obstacle and menace to Brazilian democracy has come from the landlord class, not the peasantry. In fact, contemporary efforts to extend modern citizenship rights and enhance the quality of democracy are imperiled by the steadfast defenders of the nation's status quo, not its landless groups. All this casts the MST as a modernizing and democratic force in Brazilian society, unlike the depictions conveyed by its critics.

Attention to historical evidence is also important for understanding specific developments. For instance, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, conservative analysts were quick to explain the MST's antagonism toward the Cardoso government as the result of the movement's adoption of "fundamentalist," "anti-state," and "revolutionary" ideas. A more comprehensive view of this period, however, suggests a different line of interpretation. While it is true that the Cardoso administration distributed more land than all of his predeces-

sors combined, its efforts were basically reactive and defensive in nature. They were not propelled by a programmatic drive to support peasant agriculture and transform the nation's agrarian structure. Instead, as Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, Sue Branford, and other contributors to this book show, these policies were prompted by growing MST mobilizations and intense public protest over two police massacres of landless peasants. Cardoso's land reform program coincided with his decision to transform Brazil's development model and establish a neoliberal state, fully integrated with the global market. After the MST's 1997 national march to Brasília, the Cardoso government began to view the movement's rising popularity, strong ties with the rival PT, and forceful critique of its neoliberal policies with growing apprehension.

Responding to this perception of threat, the second Cardoso administration ushered in a discernable effort to undermine the MST. The government cut back public funding for agrarian reform and farm credits. With World Bank support, it instituted a local, market-based approach to land distribution, which severely undercut the MST's capacity for collective action.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, the government began to criminalize the movement's protest activities, penalizing all land occupations, while coordinating an offensive with leading news outlets to denigrate the MST's favorable public image, by running stories alleging corruption within the MST.<sup>28</sup> What's more, the Cardoso government fired 1,200 agronomists working with land reform settlements and significantly reduced the staff of the national land reform agency, INCRA. During this time, the number of INCRA employees in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, for example, was cut down by nearly 85%.<sup>29</sup> The federal government's retreat on agrarian reform coincided with the 1999 devaluation of the national currency, which facilitated agribusiness export, enhanced land market values, and reduced opportunities for government land purchases.

In light of these facts, it is hard to view the MST's harsh reaction to the Cardoso government as impelled by purely "dogmatic" ideological beliefs, or any sense of "Ludditism," "pseudo-military adventurism," "childish Leninism," and "regressive utopia." A more reasonable explanation would simply treat this as a political conflict of interests and values. Just as the Cardoso administration was at liberty to pursue a policy of state retrenchment and market liberalization, so was the MST entitled to believe that these actions would hinder the implementation of land reform and other public efforts to reduce social inequality.

A concern for historical facts, then, enhances an appreciation for the many complexities at stake. Uniform depictions of the MST should be treated with caution, given the assorted settings, processes, and impacts at stake. Moreover, any serious effort to grasp its actions requires ongoing field experience. Given the movement's dynamic and innovative character, frozen images can become outdated over a brief lapse of time.<sup>30</sup> The following comments provide a framework for analyzing different and intricate aspects of the MST's struggle for

agrarian reform. These features include the MST's mobilizations; relations with the state and rule of law; mobilizing resources; motivations; and settlements.

### *Mobilizations*

As the contributors to this book demonstrate, MST mobilizations combine lawful protest and acts of civil disobedience. They generally include masses of people and the participation of entire families. The movement's main pressure tactics, as others and I have shown, involve organizing protest camps, long distance marches, demonstrations, road blockades, hunger strikes, sit-ins in public buildings, and land occupations of mostly idle farms. MST mobilizations regularly take place amid ongoing lobbying activities and negotiations with public authorities. Ondetti, Wambergue, and Afonso underscore the fact that the MST's modern form of contention has actually helped restrain rural violence in the Amazonian frontier. In contrast to traditional squatter land struggles, MST mobilizations are massive in scale, well-organized, family-inclusive, and geared toward making explicit demands on the state. In this way and unlike the squatters, the MST is able to avert direct confrontation with gunmen often hired by landlords. By channeling social conflict through nonviolent means, the MST has actually played a civilizing role in the Brazilian countryside.

On sporadic occasions, mobilizations undertaken by the MST have sparked brawls with the police or resulted in damage to property. Rarer still, some of these clashes and internal power tussles in land reform settlements have ended in tragic deaths. These situations merit a careful analysis. For one, it is important to acknowledge that land struggles in Brazil and elsewhere are hardly a "tea party." Given the stakes and nature of the conflict, a measure of rough play is almost unavoidable. Brazil has over seventy landless organizations and scores of informal groupings engaged in local land struggles. Compared to these other groups, the MST is the most disciplined movement. The sense of self-restraint nurtured among its activists has helped maintain a nonviolent orientation toward land conflicts. Violence, as George Mészáros underscores, is not part of the MST's modus operandi. If anything, MST activists are far more likely to suffer from wanton physical violence than inflict it upon others.

Injuries produced in the context of MST mobilizations are generally accidental, rather than intentional. Careful scrutiny of the facts will find that many of these incidents are actually the result of police provocations or acts of self-defense amid violent attacks by landlord militias. Press coverage of the MST tends to spotlight these physical clashes, while underreporting the many other (less dramatic) efforts made to resolve the underlying impasse in a peaceful manner. In doing so, they distort the overall character of MST mobilizations.



### *Relations with the State and Rule of Law*

All contributors to this book have found the MST to be keenly engaged with the state. Lygia Maria Sigaud's study of landless struggles in Pernambuco, in particular, demystifies the assumptions that the MST is intrinsically hostile toward the state. The bellicose rhetoric between the state and peasant groups, she contends, masks a relationship that also includes elements of close cooperation and mutual dependency. In fact, state actions have rendered the MST's protest camps a legitimate instrument for establishing entitlement claims among the rural poor. Marcelo Rosa extends this point further and argues that the MST is responsible for the emergence of a new pattern of interaction between the Brazilian state and social movements. Nowadays, he observes, public officials are inclined only to recognize grassroots groups that adopt the MST's "movement form."

Others, like myself, highlight the MST's general disposition to negotiate with state authorities, while using pressure tactics to improve its bargaining power. In my chapter on Rio Grande do Sul, I described the movement's involvement in running the state's agrarian reform bureau under a PT governor. Wendy Wolford depicted a pattern of close interactions between MST leaders and local governments in Pernambuco's coastal region. Ondetti, Wambergue, and Afonso claimed that MST mobilizations have enhanced the presence of the federal government in the Amazonian frontier. Branford's review of the MST's historic links with the PT and support for the party's election campaigns denoted a longstanding and practical MST recognition of the importance of democratic institutions.

The idea of a fundamental opposition between the MST and the law, Mészáros asserts, oversimplifies what is an altogether complex and rich relationship. It omits a fact relevant to many social movements around the world and in history, namely, their role as architects of an alternative legal order. The movement's difficulties with Brazil's legal system cannot ignore the country's historic rural inequities and oligarchic domination of legal institutions; the judiciary's own crippling bureaucratic, class-biased procedures; and enduring human rights violations and impunity in the countryside. Amid these predictable clashes with the law, the MST has also taken an active part in the nation's debates over the interpretation of existing laws. Through its dedicated and expanding National Network of Popular Lawyers (RENAP), which includes more than 500 attorneys, the movement and its allies are frequently involved in running legal cases and lobbying higher echelons of the judiciary. In one of its major victories, a 1996 decision by one of Brazil's highest courts ruled that land occupations designed to hasten reform were "substantially distinct" from criminal acts against property. According to Mészáros, MST clashes with the law should also be appraised in terms of their long-term contributions toward rebalancing the nation's social and legal order, rather than simply dismissed

as acts of subversion. In sum, for all its radical rhetoric and street opposition, a closer examination of the movement's regular activities reveals a myriad of constructive interactions with Brazil's political institutions.<sup>31</sup>

### *Mobilizing Resources*

Over the years the MST has cultivated its own mobilizing resources and has grown to become a highly complex and sophisticated grassroots organization. Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, Horacio Martins de Carvalho, and I describe the MST as a multidimensional, networklike organization, composed of various decentralized yet well-coordinated layers of representation and collective decision making. The MST's national, state, and regional branches are also organized into different task sectors dealing with an array of practical issues—from education; human rights; grassroots organization and training; finances; international relations; production, cooperation, and the environment to gender; health; and culture. In addition, the movement has created legally registered organizations that help channel public and international resources for its educational programs and agricultural development projects.

The MST is a mass movement operating in a continent-size nation with a decentralized state and significant political freedoms. People are at liberty to join and leave the movement. Moreover, its members are regularly exposed to adverse and even hostile information on the MST through the mass media. Under these circumstances, it is hard to imagine a poor people's organization ever succeeding on a national scale with a "militaristic" leadership that "controls," "indoctrinates," and "manipulates" its followers, as some analysts suggest. Rather, the MST's organizational success seems to reflect other attributes, notably, the movement's ability to marshal a consensus through internal debates and collective decision-making bodies; its ample experience in coordinating an array of activities; its capacity to maintain a flexible, versatile, and innovative organization; its substantial investment in consciousness-raising and educational efforts; and the discipline and intense commitment of its activists.<sup>32</sup>

The MST would not exist without the support of a broad constellation of social and political actors. Since its early years, as Ivo Poletto, Fernandes, and I highlighted, the MST has relied on the support of significant sectors of the Catholic Church, a number of Protestant congregations, rural and urban trade unions, student groups, middle-class professionals, NGOs, and progressive politicians from the PT and other political parties. Over the years, the MST has taken part in numerous national and international coalitions and developed an extensive network of overseas supporters. The nature, scope, and intensity of its interactions with other groups have naturally varied over time and from place to place. As Rosa, Ondetti, Wambergue, and Afonso showed in the cases of Pernambuco and Pará, MST relations with other peasant groups can oscillate between close cooperation and bitter competition. To infer, however, from the

normal frictions of movement politics that the MST is a closed organization and is hostile toward forming partnerships with other groups ignores the fact that the MST has long played an active role in several national, regional, and local networks and coalitions advocating social change.<sup>33</sup>

### *Motivations*

The chapters in this book suggest that motivations within the MST are varied, wide-ranging, and often quite malleable. These can change during the course of a struggle; are susceptible to their situational dynamic; and are affected by their historical and cultural milieu. Sigaud claimed that people join MST land struggles in hope of finding a quick solution to their impoverished lives. She sees this as a strategic gamble and argues that its participants, under other circumstances, would easily opt for a better alternative. While acknowledging the importance of material calculus, especially in the initial impetus to join the land struggle, Fernandes and I suggested that other impulses—such as feelings of indignation, peasant identity, moral economy views of the land, and political consciousness—can also play an important role in sustaining the land struggle.

In chapter 6, I grouped many of these motivations under Max Weber's concept of ideal interest (or value-rational) behavior. Ideal interests are characterized by a passionate yet strategic approach to the fulfillment of nonnegotiable goals. These motivations are nurtured through MST's mobilizations and regular display of symbols—flags, songs, chants, marches, and ritual gatherings—that stir courage, vitality, and persistence among its participants. Ideal interests, I argued, usually generates intense social energy, which can help neutralize various collective action problems and fuel the movement's endurance.

Elena Calvo-González's ethnographic account of a new settlement community revealed that this phase tends to be a period of frustration and disenchantment within the MST. Amid the nostalgia for the tight-knit community life experienced during the landless encampment and disappointments over the inadequate infrastructure provided to the new settlement, the settlers must cope with power relations within their own community and in their interaction with regional MST leaders. Calvo-González's close view of an MST settlement reminded us that everyday interactions are usually messier than those represented in the broader and more stylized depictions of the movement. Wolford's review of a settlement community in Pernambuco's sugarcane region highlighted the impact of cultural legacies in understanding different conceptions of the land. Unlike family farmers in other parts of Brazil, plantation workers have historically lived off the land as wage earners. Their desire to own land is mainly about having a space where they can be free from outside controls. In this setting, settlers tend to exhibit a strong individualist ethos, which weakens the MST's influence and collective action efforts.

### *Settlements*

As the chapters by Carvalho and Carter, and by Sonia Maria P. P. Bergamasco and Luiz Antonio Norder clearly emphasized, land reform settlements in Brazil cannot be easily pigeonholed. These communities exhibit great diversity in their geographical location, size, level of economic development, organizational capacity, political awareness, cultural resources, family composition, and origin. Significant variations can also be found within settlements and between their many sponsors. Over a quarter of the nation's settlements are linked to the MST. Outside observers often ignore or downplay these distinctions and erroneously equate all land reform issues with the MST.

Actual cases of settlement failures need to be evaluated in context, rather than simply imputed on particular failings. Carvalho and I described how the Cardoso administration and predecessors largely neglected the land reform settlements created under their auspices, by failing to provide adequate infrastructure and financial credit. According to a 2002 government survey of all settlements created between 1995 and 2001, 55% of these communities had no electricity, 49% had no proper drinking water, 29% lacked elementary schools, 77% were deprived of schooling beyond the primary level, and 62% had no access to emergency health care. Moreover, many of these settlements were created in inaccessible regions, distant from local markets and public services. Despite these precarious conditions, the same study found that on a national average only 12% of all settlement farm plots distributed had been abandoned.<sup>34</sup>

Notwithstanding such limitations, leading surveys of land reform communities have actually shown a general improvement in life conditions for most settlers.<sup>35</sup> Bergamasco and Norder's study of settlements in the state of São Paulo, for example, found that 80% of the settlers claimed to have upgraded their housing conditions, 72% said they were eating better, and 58% had increased their income levels. In their study, the average family income was \$266 per month, a relatively modest sum. Yet the fact that settlers don't have to pay rent, can grow much of their own food, and live in a generally safe environment, suggests that many are likely to have a better quality of life than that found in most urban favelas. Land reform settlements, the authors add, also provide greater family security, while facilitating the revitalization of small rural towns through the diversification and reactivation of local economies.

Purely economic evaluations of land reform's merits, advanced by Graziano, Navarro, and other conservative analysts, offer a very limited measurement criterion. In fact, leading international organizations, like the United Nation's Development Program and the World Bank, have long adopted a more comprehensive set of development indicators, which go well beyond the conventional calculations of income and economic productivity. The contributors to this book share this growing consensus within the field of development studies,

and in doing so have anchored their appraisals of land reform settlements on broader notions of well-being, rather than mere monetary results.<sup>36</sup>

The observations raised here concerning MST mobilizations, relations with the state and rule of law, mobilizing resources, motivations, and settlements offer an alternative view of the MST that contrasts in many ways with mass media depictions and academic critiques outlined at the onset of this chapter. These observations do not imply that the movement should be spared criticism. The MST is certainly not a society of angels. Some conservative insights, however exaggerated and distorted, contain kernels of truth. Still, the rhetoric of reaction employed by the MST's intellectual critics hinders more than facilitates the prospects of understanding the movement and its impact on Brazil. An appreciation for context and complexity are needed to go beyond many of their crude caricatures. A historical framework and comparative perspective, along with solid empirical data, ongoing field experience, and proper conceptual tools, can decisively improve the accuracy through which this phenomenon is perceived—and foster a more constructive dialogue among contending views.

### **The Consequences**

The MST's struggle for agrarian reform provides a number of intriguing insights and lessons. Three of these will be highlighted here: the nature of the obstacles to social reform; the need for grassroots public activism to overcome these barriers; and the radical democratic impetus implicit in comparable struggles for social justice. The following comments pursue these three themes in greater detail.

#### ***Obstacles to Change***

This book sheds light on the many and significant barriers to land reform in Brazil. Their resilience is related to the combination of four basic features: their multidimensional, systemic, historical, and political qualities. The first two traits point to a variegated, complex, and interrelated set of factors that operate in a weblike synergy. The historical and political features address the impact of tradition, previous development trajectories, institutions, and practices that shape the distribution of power in Brazilian society and politics. Each of the features involved in maintaining Brazil's agrarian inequities is examined briefly below.

A comprehensive assessment of Brazil's impediments to land reform requires an awareness of the *multidimensional* issues and levels of analysis at stake. Among the key factors that need to be kept in mind are the influences of: (1) global forces, economic arrangements, and financial institutions; (2) the national development model, including its patterns of production, trade, and distribution; (3) the state, its composition, legal framework, capacity, and dis-

position; (4) the political regime, its representational formulas, political parties, and electoral practices; (5) the government, its orientation, policies, and will-power; (6) social class structure, mobility, and power correlations; and (7) civil society's configuration, resources, media access, and ideas.

These many obstacles operate in *systemic* mode. They do not function in isolation, but are interconnected in a variety of ways. As such, they generally feed on each other and create a self-sustaining cycle that bolsters impediments and resistance to change. The 1982 debt crisis, for example, and neoliberal development model adopted in the 1990s, amid global financial pressures and the dissemination of fashionable economic ideas, empowered Brazil's large landholders. As Delgado observes, much of the revenue needed to pay Brazil's foreign and domestic creditors has come from agribusiness exports. In the early years of the twenty-first century, the landlords drew on this fact—along with their strong representation in Congress, close ties to the Ministry of Agriculture, and considerable influence on the mass media—to generate a momentum that weakened President Lula's longstanding promise to implement a progressive land reform program. Academic efforts to delegitimize the MST, undertaken by scholars such as Martins, Navarro, Graziano, and Rosenfield, have also contributed to this situation. Their easy traction and diffusion in the nation's conservative press have helped foster a more hostile climate of opinion toward land reform and its proponents. Landlord representatives in civil and political society have deployed these arguments to their advantage.<sup>37</sup> In this way, civil society-based initiatives, organizations, and ideas have served to uphold Brazil's conservative interests, by drawing on numerous strategic and elective affinities.

Brazil's principal obstacles to agrarian reform are also distinctly *historical* in nature. Lest there be any doubt, the nation's exclusionary development process, sharp social inequities, influential landlord class, burgeoning agribusiness sector, oligarchic politics, weak representation of popular sectors in civil and political society, conservative judiciary, and ineffective state protection of basic human rights, have deep roots in Brazil's past. Together, these elements nurture a powerful inertia in support of the status quo.

Finally, the barriers to reform are notably *political* in character. They are related to broader power struggles in society, shaped by class configurations and political conflicts over access to state resources and protection. Furthermore, they are tied to an array of institutional mechanisms and practices that limit the political representation of popular sector interests. Brazil's patrimonial tradition; disjointed state bureaucracy; overrepresentation of conservative rural interests in Congress due to the malapportionment of legislative seats; inchoate party system; political clientelism and widespread vote buying among the poor; high costs of election campaigns; and elite control of the mass media outlets; have all reinforced the nation's "government by and for the few."<sup>38</sup> Prospects

for agrarian reform are predictably diminished when conservative opponents draw on these and other political mechanisms to stifle the impetus for change.

All this suggests that Brazil's barriers to land reform are intimately tied to its authoritarian and patrimonial legacies.<sup>39</sup> In fact, its landlord-friendly, agribusiness model of rural development was designed and bankrolled by the military regime. Since then, the state's conservative inertia has remained largely unabated, despite the regime's political democratization, its laws favoring agrarian reform, and discernible popular demand for land redistribution.

The state's protection of landlord interests is manifest through numerous practices. As noted by Delgado, rural property taxes, for instance, continue to be negligible. State oversight of the land market remains notably weak. Fraudulent land appropriations are prevalent in many parts of the country, especially the Amazon frontier. Potential areas for redistribution, which comprise close to one-third of the nation's territory, have remained mostly unaffected by government reform policies. The state's lax enforcement of agrarian laws has enabled large landholders to accumulate vast areas of unproductive land as reserve value. Furthermore, compensations for land expropriations are commonly inflated well beyond market value, thanks to the government's generous payment criteria and the judiciary's traditional deference toward landlord petitions.

The weight of Brazil's conservative inertia on agrarian matters explains, to a considerable degree, the Lula administration's decision not to revise the more than three-decades-old productivity index used to determine land expropriations, despite having a legal mandate for this. Lula's executive order would have greatly facilitated land expropriations throughout Brazil. Yet the fear of galvanizing media opposition and resistance from the influential *bancada ruralista*, the largest congressional voting bloc linked to landlord and agribusiness interests, led the Lula government to default on a longstanding promise to its landless allies.

For all their powerful weight and objective character, Brazil's obstacles to land reform are also affected by an important subjective valuation. The same hurdles after all can be perceived in different ways. For some, these impediments add to an insurmountable *fait accompli*. Others, however, see them as a challenge to overcome. Conservatives assume there are no viable or desirable alternatives. They explicate and justify what exists, and often conclude, as Navarro does, that "the time for land reform has passed." By contrast, progressives insist on defying the odds. In this, they share a spirit of resistance akin to that emblemized in the World Social Forum's motto, "Another World Is Possible." These contrasting dispositions are elegantly captured by William Sloan Coffin Jr. "Hope," he writes, "criticizes what is, hopelessness rationalizes it. Hope resists, hopelessness adapts."<sup>40</sup> In today's Brazil, the beacon of hope lies not among reform skeptics, but with those who—despite the odds—continue to struggle for its progressive implementation.



### *Public Activism*

The venue through which the MST challenges Brazil's stark social disparities is as noteworthy as the impetus itself. Latin American history records no other social movement as long lasting, large, and sophisticated as the MST. The movement's surprising success has been intimately entwined with its capacity to engage in a distinct form of social struggle: public activism. As explained in my chapter on Rio Grande do Sul, this approach to social conflict entails an organized, politicized, visible, autonomous, periodic, and nonviolent form of social confrontation. The goal here is to draw public attention, influence state policies, and persuade other societal actors. Public activism deploys modern repertoires of contention to exert pressure on the state while striving to negotiate with its authorities.

The MST's public activism has been instrumental in reinstating land reform on Brazil's national agenda. It has played a decisive role in the creation of over 2,000 agricultural settlements linked to the MST, benefiting by 2006 an estimated 135,000 landless families, through the distribution of 3.7 million hectares of land, an area the size of Switzerland or the state of West Virginia. Moreover, the movement's pressure politics and lobbying have contributed significantly to an unprecedented distribution of public resources to the rural poor, through land purchases, farming and housing credits, infrastructural development, technical assistance, educational programs, and the creation of over 300 rural cooperatives and food processing plants linked to the MST.<sup>41</sup>

Contrary to the opinion of its conservative critics, the movement's embrace of public activism has actually contributed to the advancement of democracy in Brazil by: (1) strengthening civil society through the organization and incorporation of marginalized sectors of the population; (2) fostering a civilizing process in the countryside, by harnessing, articulating, and disciplining social frustrations and deploying these through constructive actions at the grassroots level;<sup>42</sup> (3) highlighting the importance of public activism as a catalyst for social development and providing an impetus for the mobilization of other popular sector groups; (4) facilitating the extension and exercise of basic citizenship rights—civil, political, and social rights—among the poor; (5) underscoring the state's vital responsibility in protecting human rights and fostering equity enhancing reforms; (6) emphasizing the value of education, consciousness raising, self-dignity, and personal responsibility among its participants; and (7) engendering a sense of utopia, hope, and affirmation of ideals imbued in Brazil's long-run, complex, and open-ended democratization process.<sup>43</sup>

Brazil's struggle for agrarian reform suggests that public activism may well be an indispensable instrument for inequality reduction in starkly disparate societies. Such environments, of course, tend to produce daunting obstacles to change. All this implies that an amiable, purely institutionalized, top-down attempt to foster reform is more than likely to end up in empty government prom-



ises and innocuous initiatives. Under sharply unequal contexts—as in South Africa’s apartheid regime and the United States’s racial segregation policies in the South—the barriers to change need to be tackled with concerted, forceful, and disruptive pressure from below. If coupled with a bargaining process at the top, this societal drive can foster an auspicious momentum for state innovation and reform policies. Brazil’s struggle for agrarian reform shows that it would be disingenuous, at best, to expect a major impetus for the redistribution of wealth to involve anything less than a tough touch.

### *Radical Democracy*

The MST experience provides a telling lesson for the prospects of inequality reduction in the twenty-first century. During the twentieth century, the three leading formulas for dealing with the problems of wealth disparity were market economics, social revolution, and political democracy. Market economics assumed that consistent economic growth would eventually reduce both poverty and inequality.<sup>44</sup> Social revolutions, relying largely on Marxian inspiration, upheld the need for a violent takeover of the state and drastic impositions of equalizing measures. Political democracies offered a constitutional framework allowing basic civil liberties, political competition, and mass participation in the election of governing representatives. The regime’s own incentive structure, it was argued, would lead to the redistribution of wealth over the long run, namely through the development of state welfare policies.

In practice, however, each approach presented serious drawbacks. Market economics generally ignored power asymmetries and their effects on the development process. Economic growth in highly unequal societies is more likely to fuel income disparity than bridge its gap, as Brazil’s so-called economic miracle of the 1970s visibly showed.<sup>45</sup> Social revolutions often ushered traumatic episodes of violence and dreadful human rights violations. In their wake, revolutionary elites often instituted draconian policies with devastating social costs, as witnessed during the Soviet Union’s industrialization process and China’s Great Leap Forward.<sup>46</sup> Political democracy, on the other hand, has not offered clear solutions to the inequality problem either. In the 1990s, most of Latin America experienced economic growth and democratic regimes. Yet income disparity, though remaining stable in Brazil, actually increased in most other Latin American countries.<sup>47</sup> In Latin America, unlike the Western European and North American experience, democracy’s positive long-term impact appears to be quite uncertain; and obviously of no consolation to those in dire need.

Brazil’s struggle for agrarian reform provides glimpses of an alternative pathway to reducing durable social inequities. The impetus, here, can be construed as one geared toward engendering a form of radical democracy. This approach draws on political democracy’s “enabling institutional milieu,”<sup>48</sup> but argues that this framework alone is not enough. Radical democracy stresses the

importance of autonomous popular organizations, their mobilization, and their participation in development efforts. Popular engagement can be strengthened through the creation of state partnerships with grassroots groups and their representation in public agencies responsible for executing social policies. A radical democracy incorporates many elements of what Philippe C. Schmitter defined as a societal corporatist model for interest representation based on horizontal state-society linkages.<sup>49</sup> While valuing economic growth, this approach to inequality reduction insists that the poor be included in a productive process that is ecologically sustainable and provides wide access to basic consumer goods and social services.

The radical democratic course, then, combines four basic elements: (1) public activism; (2) institutional mechanisms for developing state-society partnerships and effective societal accountability;<sup>50</sup> (3) a responsive government leadership, sympathetic to grassroots demands; and (4) a functioning state, capable of investing public resources for social welfare and the economic development of the poorest strata in society. The first three features presuppose a political democracy. The latter two explain the MST's support for the political Left and defense of a national development model led by a robust state, rather than powerful economic actors.

The radical democratic approach to inequality reduction is certainly not devoid of problems and practical limitations. Its relevance, however, cannot be easily dismissed. Underlying this formula is a cumulus of experience and ideas that warrant closer attention. The MST's contributions to this debate are apt to stir passionate arguments and fuel creative solutions in the years to come.

The effort to redress Brazil's yawning societal gap calls for innovative ideas, audacious experiments, and an appreciation for the "constructive impatience," in Amartya Sen's fitting term, of groups like the MST.<sup>51</sup> Alternative forms of impatience are apt to be far less edifying. In a mid-2006 letter addressed to "the archaeologist of the future," Luis Fernando Veríssimo, one of Brazil's most beloved humorists, wondered if his country had reached its "last years of patience." In his usual down-to-earth style, Veríssimo wrote,

All of Brazil's manifestations of social unease, up until Lula's election, had been polite petitions to our dominant minority requesting that they hand back the nation to its excluded majority. Throughout this time it was impossible to imagine what would happen if these good manners faded away, when a society in desperation began to demand an end to the criminal incompetence that had for years defrauded people from access to health care, security, education and work, in order to give the banks greater profits, offer assurances to the speculators and a good life to the few. When "give it back!" became a call to war.

Brazil always belonged to a self-perpetuated minority, but never, in the past, has the nation's majority had as clear a notion of their internal banishment, of their exile without leaving their place. Lula's election, among other things, conveyed this newfound recognition. . . . And since Lula frustrated peoples' hope for change by continuing the same economic policies of the previous government, what I could tell the archaeologist of the future is that we may be living Brazil's last years of patience. Although nobody seems to have the least fear that that which is not returned for better will have to be given back for worse.<sup>52</sup>

## Notes

The author would like to thank Ralph Della Cava and Kristina Svensson for their valuable comments and suggestions. All translations from the Portuguese and Spanish were prepared by the author.

1. The ideas espoused by all three analysts have received ample attention in Brazil's mainstream media. Martins, a professor emeritus of the Universidade de São Paulo, is Brazil's most prolific rural sociologist. Navarro is a sociology professor at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Both were once advisors to the MST and the CPT. After the mid-1990s, Martins and Navarro each had a personal falling out with these organizations and served as consultants to the Cardoso government. Graziano was a close advisor to President Cardoso. He writes a regular column for three of the nation's leading newspapers and directs an NGO dedicated to the promotion of agribusiness interests. Rosenfield is a philosophy professor at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. He writes frequently for two of Brazil's leading dailies. The reader should know that Leslie Bethel, director of the University of Oxford's Centre for Brazilian Studies, and I originally asked Martins to write the conclusion for this book; however, he politely declined our request.
2. Martins (2000a: 18–19, 26). Fernando Henrique Cardoso offers a similar appraisal in his presidential memoir. He describes the MST as belonging “to a niche of resistance to modernity that is a conveyor of a regressive utopia.” According to Cardoso, the landless movement looks at the world “through the rearview mirror” (2006: 70).
3. Martins (2000a: 49, 60).
4. Martins (2003b: 27, 44); see also Navarro (2002a: 229, 2003). For a more caustic view of the CPT's and MST's “brainwashing” of the rural poor, see Rosenfield (2006: 240, 257, 326, 329, and 373).
5. Interview with Navarro, in Scolese (2003).
6. Interview with Navarro, in Agência Folha (2003).
7. Navarro (2002a: 208, 211, 2002b: 279).
8. Navarro (2002b: 277, 2002a: 206–7).
9. Navarro (2002b: 279); see also Navarro (2002a: 218).
10. Navarro (2002a: 215–17).
11. Graziano (2004: 133).
12. Graziano (2004: 38–39).
13. Graziano (2004: 108). Drawing on a book published by a journalist linked to the ultra-conservative Catholic group Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), Graziano describes

one of the MST's historic communities in Rio Grande do Sul, the Annoni settlement, as "the largest rural *favela* in Latin America." He assures the reader that this claim is true because "nobody has disproved it" (2004: 128–29). When I visited the Annoni settlement, however, in mid-2005, I encountered a quite prosperous farming community, with three cooperatives, five agro-industries, three supermarkets, and a large grain silo. Since 1996, these settlers have repeatedly elected one of their own as a local town mayor.

14. Graziano (2004: 239, 72).
15. Graziano (2004:161).
16. Graziano (2004: 244)
17. Graziano (2004: 304, 72, 2006).
18. Rosenfield (2006: 220–21, 228–38, 253–54).
19. Rosenfield (2006: 247).
20. Rosenfield (2006: 252–53, 303, 309, 301, and 311).
21. The two books in question are Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT/RS) and Comunidade Pe. Josino dos Freis Capuchinhos e Franciscanos—Tupanciretã, RS (2003) and Mitsue Morissawa (2001). In addition, Rosenfield analyzes two magazine issues of the MST's *Revista Sem Terra*, published in 2005; and two unpublished documents apprehended during a 2003 police raid at a landless encampment in Rio Grande do Sul, including the personal agenda of a local MST leader. Rosenfield's ideas are not informed by any relevant field experience.
22. Martins's and Navarro's embittered disenchantment with their erstwhile friends in the CPT and MST are no doubt influenced by their personal falling out as mentors of both organizations. Theirs, in many ways, is a professorial-like reprimand of their former pupils. Navarro, for instance, describes the MST's "fundamentalist perspective of political action" as "entirely disassociated with Brazil's agrarian reality" (2002b: 267). Instead, he adds, it "grasps on to its vulgar Marxism," completely ignoring important theoretical advances made by "Western Marxist" scholars (2002b: 279–80). Martins's interpretive essays written in the 2000s carry the same message. The following quote from his book *O Sujeito Oculito* [The Hidden Subject], is revealing of his current views and a good illustration of his writing style. He asserts, "Much is said about agrarian reform. But the substantive aspects of the struggle for land and land reform are lost in intricate ideological babbles, unfounded affirmations and inconsistent proposals. The landless workers move about in a difficult search, they follow guidelines that are alien to them; they fumble without a consistent theoretical reference, oriented by intermediary groups that have serious theoretical failures and inadequate sensitivity towards proper theoretical and interpretive ideas. They get lost in the uncertainties typical of those who harbor a just obsession that does not nourish itself on well-founded reflections and continuous critical examinations of their own actions" (Martins 2003c: 22). As it seems, then, all would be in much better shape if only the land reform activists had "duly listened to their enlightened professors."
23. Hirschman (1991: 7).
24. Bobbio (1995: 15). The Left, Bobbio adds, "draws on the conviction that most of the inequalities it abhors, and would like to make disappear, are social, and thus removable." By contrast, the Right "draws on the opposing conviction, that sees [these inequities] as natural, and as such unchangeable" (1995: 146). For the historic Left, the concentration of private property, according to Bobbio, has been "one of the main, if not the most significant, obstacle to equality" between human beings (1995: 167).

25. The distinction between neoliberal and socialist views of the MST builds on Sampaio's (2010) arguments. For a neoliberal depiction of the MST as a "lunatic" group, see the opinion article by Naím (2004), editor of *Foreign Policy*, a prestigious journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
26. See table 1.6 in my introductory chapter to this book.
27. On the World Bank's land policies in Brazil, see Sauer and Pereira (2006); Pereira (2005, 2010); Martins (2004); and Barros, Sauer, and Schwartzman (2003).
28. For further details on this onslaught against the MST, see Branford (chap. 13, this volume) and Comparato (2000).
29. See my chapter on Rio Grande do Sul in this volume.
30. As Horatio Martins de Carvalho well noted, "The MST is very hard to pin down, it's constantly shifting and evolving. In this sense, the MST is like a gust of wind. Each visit to an MST settlement generates some novelty—new problems to address, new ideas to discuss" (Carter 2004a: 9).
31. For a more comprehensive discussion of the MST's multifarious interactions with the state, see Carter (2011). On the movement's complex relations with the rule of law, also see also Laureano (2007) and Hammond (1999).
32. In fact, for all the imputations of "Leninism" and efforts to disqualify the MST as a social movement, academic detractors like Navarro never define what a "Leninist organization" is and largely ignore the vast scholarly literature on social movements.
33. At the national level, the MST has been active in a number of other progressive Brazilian networks and organizations, such as the National Forum for Agrarian Reform and Justice in the Countryside, the Brazilian Association for Agrarian Reform (ABRA), *Consulta Popular*, the National Network of Popular Independent Lawyers (RENAPE), the Coordination of Social Movements (CMS), and more recently, the church-sponsored Popular Assembly.
34. See Sparovek's interview with Lerrer (2003: 321). Sparovek's (2003) study, sponsored by the FAO and Ministry of Agrarian Development, is the most extensive survey of land reform settlements in Brazil.
35. The main reference in this regard is the excellent study undertaken by Heredia, Medeiros, Palmeira, Cintrão, and Leite (2004).
36. On these development views, see Sen (1999), Chambers (1997), and Narayan (2000). For a thoughtful application of Sen's ideas to Brazil's agrarian reform debate, see Leite, with Ávila (2006a).
37. A clear illustration of this took place in 2005, when an investigative commission of Brazil's National Congress, controlled by representatives of the rural elite, approved a report with scathing attacks on the MST, which was even accused of "terrorism." The conservative politicians responsible for preparing the document made ample use of the ideas expounded by Navarro, Graziano, and other MST detractors; see Lupion (2005). For a critical appraisal of this report, see Sauer, Souza, and Tubino (2006).
38. Montero (2005: 51). Useful references on these obstacles can be found in my introductory chapter to this volume.
39. The notion of "authoritarian legacies" employed here draws on Hite and Cesarini (2004).
40. Coffin (2005: 19).
41. For sources and a brief discussion of these numbers, see my introductory chapter, and Carter and Carvalho (chap. 9, this volume).
42. The concept of a "civilizing process," which arises through the disciplining of passions

and other raw impulses into more methodical forms of behavior, is based on Elias (1982).

43. This approach to democratization draws on Whitehead (2002). These contributions to democracy are discussed further in Carter (2009).
44. For a highly influential statement in this regard, see Kuznets (1954).
45. Between 1966 and 1976 annual GDP growth averaged an impressive 9.2%, yet income inequality rose sharply, by 24% between 1960 and 1977, from 0.50 to 0.62 on the Gini coefficient scale (Fishlow 1972; Paes de Barros, Henriques, and Mendonça 2000).
46. Russia's communist revolution and reign of terror under Joseph Stalin is estimated to have cost at least 12 million lives. The gigantic famine that followed Chairman Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward caused the death of no less than 20 million Chinese. I am grateful to my colleague Eric Lohr, a Russian history professor at American University, for his insights on the Soviet era, e-mail communication, March 13, 2006. The number of Chinese deaths is from Spence (1990: 583), based on figures that are currently widely regarded as low estimates.
47. Karl (2003: 138)
48. O'Donnell (2004: 11).
49. Schmitter's (1974) seminal article contrasts "societal corporatism" with "state corporatism," which is based on a vertical integration of social groups.
50. On societal forms of accountability, see Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000).
51. Sen (1999: 11).
52. Verissimo (2006).